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BOMBARDIER'S MASS PRODUCTION OF THE SNOWMOBILE: 
THE CANADIAN EXCEPTION? 
Chris DeBresson* and Joseph Lampe1** 
(Although) the Canadian record in innovation is 
not quite as dismal as popularly supposed ... a 
high proportion of innovative products are custom 
made for one or two customers, and fail to grow 
into mass produced standardized products.1 
A disjunction seems to have beset Canadian industrial and econ­
omic development in the last forty years. On the one hand, 
Canada has enjoyed a high rate of growth and a considerable 
measure of prosperity, placing it well within the ranks of ad­
vanced industrial nations; on the other hand, this growth has 
not produced the prerequisite of advanced industrialization: 
a dynamic, integrated capital-intensive high technology sector. 
This absence is particularly striking in view of the increasing 
evidence of an indigenous and energetic Canadian technological 
capacity.2 Even a casual survey of Canadian institutions, 
engineering and scientific bodies as well as a growing list of 
inventions which may be branded 'made in Canada' attests to the 
existence of an unfulfilled potential. Recent evidence proves 
there is also innovation in Canadian industry even if Canada 
does not seem to reap some or all of its expected benefits.3 
Various explanations have been advanced to resolve this para­
dox. The disjunction between economic and technological de­
velopment has been ascribed, in turn, to the overbearing 
presence of foreign multinationals, conservative banking poli­
cies, shortage of capital, geographic fragmentation and the 
small size of market. While a combination of these factors 
undoubtedly must play an important role in explaining the 
state of Canadian industrialization, this paper will explore 
another dimension of the problem. Although the process of 
technological innovation is intimately bound to the economic 
process, it is not reduceable to the latter. To begin with: 
technological activity does not immediately or always translate — 
in Canada or elsewhere — into economic benefits, or iu.ce vzK&a. 
This process of translation is complex and may be more profit­
ably analyzed through a historical rather than a purely econ­
omic approach. 
Most economic historians have tended to concentrate on the 
distinction between the inventive and the innovative phase of 
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technological activity, thus adopting Schumpeter's seminal 
distinction. J.J. Brown based his ldza.6 In Exile on such a 
distinction.^ in Schumpeter's and Kuznets' visions, innova­
tion is the dynamic element which spurs the rapid growth of an 
industry and the rapidly-growing industries will engender the 
economic growth of nations. Not all innovations, however, 
lead to growth. Beyond Schumpeter's powerful but reductionist 
concept of the innovating entrepreneur, it is necessary to dis­
tinguish between the many different types of innovations and 
enterprises as well as their different economic impacts. 
Secondly, it may be that the dynamic economic effects are more 
a result of how different innovations combine and reinforce 
each other than the indirect effect of any initial innovation. 
These qualifications lead us to use two concepts. 
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
The first concept comes from economic history and industrial 
organization^ and relates to the production mode. It is impor­
tant to distinguish between customized production processes, 
batch production and line production. Such a distinction was 
useful in comparing nineteenth-century British and American 
technological development. Economically, innovative mass-
produced products have a greater impact than innovations de­
veloped for specific and isolated uses. The innovative acti­
vity of any country always involves a co-existence between 
custom, batch and assembly line production. The economic and 
industrial effects of innovations vary considerably depending 
on the scope of their applications and the scale of their pro­
duction. But a common feature of advanced economies is their 
ability to foster the transformation from a customized innova­
tion into full-fledged mass production where the greatest 
economic benefits may be reaped. It is in this transition, 
we suggest, that Canada may so often be deficient. Our first 
hypothesis is that Canadian industrial innovation tends to 
remain custom and small batch oriented. Consequently, one 
can expect to find innovative capability without many indus­
trial and economic benefits. 
Let us first define distinctly these production modes. Custom, 
batch and line production may be distinguished from one another 
by the number of units produced in a given period. As such, 
they appear to the economist as part of a continuum. Although 
these different production modes do not differ by fixed quan­
tities, they are nonetheless qualitatively different. This 
difference is most notable in the relationship between market 
and production, on one hand, and the organization of produc­
tion work on the other. In customized production, the English 
tailor or gun maker would make, on order, a suit or a gun 'made 
to measure' the client's needs. In batch production, a manu­
facturer produces on order a set of parts and assembles them; 
and he may make a few extra in case of 'lemons' or because he 
anticipates further demand. The cost of a few extra units is 
not that great in comparison to the cost of having to manufac­
ture a faulty part again. Also, the opportunity for rapid 
earnings through the sales of additional units is a further 
incentive. Line production produces for stock and requires 
an anticipation of future market demand. The mass producer 
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also tries to shape the market by product design and adver­tizing, attempting to capture market share through his own distribution system. In addition, the mass producer finances an inventory and invests in specialized equipment. 
Another concept which will be useful for subsequent analysis is that of technical 'system.1 The French historian of tech­nology, Bertrand Gilles, defines a system of interdependent techniques as a combination whose progress is dependent on the simultaneous progress of all components; the stagnation of one component technique can block the advance of the whole system. The technical momentum generated by a systems innovation is much greater than that of a single innovation.^ 
Systems innovations are most often combined with a standard­ized, iterative, mass production process. Although some large engineering works are custom made to specifications, they then serve as the equipment for standardized processes of production. Canada more often adopts its technical systems from abroad, leaving the dynamic initiative in economic growth to come from outside the country. In the capital goods sector we often witness large, customized projects such as turbines for hy­draulic power plants which are part and parcel of the move towards higher economies of scale. These are the A-lne, qua non of mass production. Our corollary hypothesis is that innova­tions in complex manufacturing are marginal because they are borrowed from abroad. We rarely find the transition to mass production accompanied by associated development of indigenous manufacturing know-how. This lacuna leaves Canadian innova­tive potential vulnerable to quick imitation by low cost pro­ducers . 
We will approach these hypotheses through a discussion of the Bombardier case, which illustrates both what is typical and what is atypical about Canadian innovation. The Bombardier story has ramifications that go beyond the Canadian context. Elsewhere, we have analyzed it with respect to the theory of technological life cycles.7 Here, however, we will focus on this case as a testing ground for hypotheses concerning macro-industrial development in Canada. 
THE CASE OF BOMBARDIER'S SNOWMOBILE 
The history of Bombardier raises interesting "questions. The initial development of what was later to become the snowmobile was made as early as 1927, thus Bombardier's snowmobile tech­nology has a long history.** The key invention and development on which his technical leadership and reputation is based dates from 1935. 
Joseph-Armand Bombardier, the inventor, had both the leisure that is necessary for the process of trial and error which the development of a new technology requires, as well as a clear vision of the problems to be solved in order to satisfy local needs. Bombardier's living and working environment undoubtedly had an important impact on the direction of his inventive ac­tivity. During the idle winter months, Valcourt, his home village, was roadless and snowbound. No 'roadmobiles,' as they 
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used to call them, could reach his Imperial Oil Garage. During 
the winters, Bombardier had considerable time to ponder the 
shortcomings of the new mode of transport. His inventive 
activities in the 1920s and 1930s can be seen as an effort to 
replace the tire automobile with a track-and-ski automobile as 
the basic transport vehicle of snowbound northern regions. He 
developed a vision of an automobile more adapted to the road­
less and snowy north. The environment to which he had adapted 
his technology, however, was transformed by outside factors 
faster than he could diffuse his cm£one.<lg£. Canada's attraction 
for American tourists and motorists, its rapid adoption of the 
Model T Ford and the militarization of the economy paved the 
roads. Ironically, Bombardier's vehicle would be asked to 
clear the snow from the roads for the ill-adapted automobiles. 
Later, the inventor's social vision remained important. When 
he and his son developed a monocycle version of the snow­
mobile, the inventor committed himself to the model more than 
he had to any previous one. He saw it as a means to help the 
civilizing mission of his Catholic missionary friends in the 
Arctic and as a family sport which could break the winter iso­
lation of households in rural communities. 
Between 1927 and 1937, Bombardier transformed, through adapta­
tions, the then-dominant Model T Ford design into an original 
concept which bore little resemblance to the famous original. 
He started by simply substituting skis and tracks for the 
tires of Fords and Fergusons. Iron tracks were simply over­
laid on four back tires. By 1931, iron tracks were replaced 
by rubber tracks with iron traverses; in addition, eight 'crazy' 
wheels, consisting of brake drums, insured more traction con­
tact. By 1935, the core technology of Bombardier's future 
snowmobile system was already present: the double reinforced 
rubber tracks and the sprocket motive wheels. The sprocket 
wheels replaced the motive tires and its teeth inserted them­
selves between the tracks, producing better traction and pre­
venting the accumulation of snow on the track. In 1936, the 
'crazy' wheels were made independent of each other. Separate 
suspension systems were then introduced: the whole vehicle 
was lowered and a special frame was designed. Inventive 
efforts were then directed towards reducing the weight, im­
proving the speed and traction of his vehicles. By 1940, 
Bombardier's CLutono.ige.6 (87 and B12CS models) no longer re­
sembled automobiles. For the monocycle version of the snow­
mobile, Bombardier's son Germain developed, in 1958, a single 
wide, continuous tread with two sets of sprocket teeth holes, 
eliminating wheels altogether. In 1962 a pulley transmission 
and, in 1965, an automatic transmission for variable speeds 
were patented. Later, Bombardier Ltd asked Lohnerwerke GMBH 
of Vienna to develop a rotary engine — the Rotax — for the 
snowmobile. The snowmobile had by now evolved into an original 
system with most of its own components, an impressive case of 
technical creation through progressive adaptation. 
Another aspect of the growth of the Bombardier firm was the 
role of the extended family. In 1957, Norman Taylor wrote a 
thesis on the French-Canadian lack of entrepreneurship.9 
Adopting a Weber-Parsons hypothesis of entrepreneurship based 
upon small families, Protestant values and separation of family 
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and business, he concluded that Catholic ethics and the ex­tended family were a hindrance to entrepreneurship in Québec. Yet, Joseph-Armand Bombardier seems to have exploited the re­sources of the extended family for investment, control and transmission of tacit know-how. His brother Alphonse was the accountant, his son Germain was in charge of the rubber com­ponent manufacture in nearby Roskin Falls and other relatives were put in charge of other subsidiaries; J. Armand Bombardier's successor was his son-in-law Laurent Beaudoin and although he brought in many Harvard Business School graduates as profes­sional managers, the company is still controlled by the Bombardier family foundation. Informal communication of problems, their context and promising avenues for their solution flowed easily between J. Armand and his inventor son Germain. 
We can distinguish five basic periods of Bombardier's snow­mobile development: from the 1920s to 1935, when the core technology emerged out of the adaptation of automobiles; from 1935 to the late 1940s, during which Bombardier produced his snowmobiles in batches with few variations; the third period after the Second World War until 1958, during which he extended the applications of sprocket-and-track technology to the use of various industries; the fourth period after 1959 until 1972-5, when mass production of the Ski-Doo became the dominant operation; and, lastly, after the saturation of the North American snowmobile market (1972), when Bombardier Ltd diversified into a multi-product, multi-plant transport equip­ment manufacturer. 
CONTRASTS BETWEEN CUSTOM, BATCH AND LINE PRODUCTION 
The contrast between the production operations of these dif­ferent periods is marked. From 1926 to 1936, Bombardier pro­duced almost one-of-a-kind units to specific orders of indi­vidual customers. As a secondary activity of his Imperial Oil gasoline concession, he used his skills as a general mechanic. In the summer of 1936 he produced batches of parts, stocked them in empty neighbourhood barns and, in the fall, moved them into a new manufacturing plant where he hand assembled the models with farm labour, seasonally available in the winter. From that point on, the manufacturing of auto-ne,4,gt6 became his major source of income. He employed a pool of skilled mechanics and semi-skilled seasonal labour, producing various models in batches of different sizes. In 1959, with the design of the Ski-Doo, large batch and then line production started a transition that would only be completed after the inventor's death. After 1965, Bombardier Ltd's manufacturing operations were transformed into a Detroit-style assembly line with an overhead, serpentine line, routinized operations, a hierar­chical and functional organization, semi-skilled labour and specialized machinery. 
The decline of the snowmobile market, however, forced this com­pany to diversity and produce a variety of small vehicles such as monocycles and SeaDoos on its assembly line. In 1975, Bombardier Ltd. acquired M.L. Worthington, a large railway rolling-stock manufacturer and thus embarked on broader diver­sification into various transport equipment; by then, it became 
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a multi-product, multi-plant transnational operation com­
bining line production of standard designs with batch produc­
tion of special equipment. 
The contrast between the sales and marketing of the different 
operations is also marked. For half a century, Bombardier's 
innovations were directed to special applications and therefore 
were less known. In spite of sustained demand for two of his 
models — the B12 Military transporter and the MUSKEG, all-
terrain industrial vehicle — J. Armand Bombardier did not 
standardize or mass produce any of his models before the Ski-
Doo. Integrated line production was only achieved after his 
death. Just before his death, Bombardier was still concentra­
ting his efforts and financial resources on industrial applica­
tions, in particular, the material handling problems of forestry. 
Given the inventive proclivity of the founder, product designs 
were almost as numerous as the applications of the technology. 
The contrast between periods is also reflected in the length 
of runs. In 1927, Bombardier sold his first CLu£o-ne.<Lge. to a 
Valcourt Hotel owner who wanted to be able to get his customers 
in and out of the snowbound village. This model was a success; 
he ultimately sold about ten of these. Veterinarians and doc­
tors who needed to get to the sick quickly in winter required 
this adapted automobile. In the 1920s Bombardier came out with 
a new model every year. Each new model would incorporate a 
significant new technical component of the eventual technical 
system. The sales, however, were by unit or in small batches 
(Table 1). As a batch producer after 1937, Bombardier produced 
not only for individual customers but also for categories of 
customers. Such market segments included physicians, veterin­
arians, ambulance operators, mail services and governments for 
defence in the arctic, petroleum exploration, forest manage­
ment and road and sidewalk clearing. This involved anticipa­
ting demand and the clientele's buying capacity. But the mar­
ket niches remained segmented. As a line producer in the 
1960s, Bombardier Ltd. sold to the consumer and the mass mar­
ket. A distribution network was established. Although 
J. Armand Bombardier did not believe in advertising, the pro­
fessional, Harvard-trained managers who came into the firm 
after his death relied heavily on more conventional marketing 
approaches. 
From custom-designed specialty products to product variations 
for market segments and then finally to a standardized, simple 
product for the mass consumer market, Bombardier had an in­
creasing economic impact. At first, his adaptations of the 
automobile only allowed an increase of its use to a few wealthy 
professionals during the winter months. Later, as Bombardier 
developed varied industrial applications, the automotive tech­
nology was made available to numerous industries which bene­
fitted from increased performance and reduced operating costs. 
But wide economic impact only occurred when a product for the 
consumer enabled the workers of the Bombardier factories them­
selves to acquire, from their salaries, the simple, reliable 
Ski-Doo which sold at one point for as low as $600. This 
'final demand linkage' with the income generation of the pro­
duction activities resulted in economic growth for the region. 
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TABLE 1 
Total Numbers Sold of Models or Series, 1927-69 
YEAR INTRODUCED INNOVATION TOTAL SALES 
1927 Steel Track over Tires with Front Skis 12 
19 36 Independent Crazy Wheels; Spring Rear Axle 12 
1938 Improved Station Wagon 400 
WAR PRODUCTION CONTROLS 
1940 12-Passenger Troop Carrier 4,000 
(Toboggan-shaped, independent Back 
Wheel Suspension, on Skis) 
1949 Tractor Tracks T.T.A. 
1950 Tracked Truck 
1951 MUSKEG 
1959 Skidoo 
Table 1 provides an idea of the magnitude of the production 
runs. The yearly production runs of successful models in­
crease relentlessly, but not smoothly; the scale, of production 
increased by jerks. Little by little, as the market broadened 
for his product. Bombardier started to exploit economies of 
scale. The apparent continuum in increase in scale of pro­
duction, however, obscures two other phenomena: first, the 
importance of economies of product variation in the custom and 
batch mode of production and second the strategic decisions and 
subsequent organizational discontinuities, which were necessary 
in order to reap economies of scale. 
FROM PRODUCT VARIATION TO ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
Product variation was dominant for nearly fifty years. Two 
incentives for such product variation are clearly apparent. 
First, the application of automobile techniques to the needs 
of the clients, their adaptation to the physical constraints 
of snow traction and tread and ski technology called for varia­
tion. Second, general-purpose machinery and mechanics' know-how 
could be shared in the production of technologically proximate 
designs. By producing slightly different models for forest 
management and petroleum exploration, Bombardier could reduce 
the unit price for both models. He also used common compon­
ents in different models: sprocket, tread and crazy wheels. 
Even after the introduction of the standard design of the Ski-
Doo, some minor product variation continued. After the inven­
tor's death, Bombardier Ltd. started in 1964 to engage in sys­
tematic market research. Different models with different price 
tags tried to appeal to different segments of the consumer 
market. Some models — like the Elan — sold for as little as 
$595, while the higher powered 'Cadillac' version — the 
Elite — sold for many thousands of dollars. Two brand names 
('Ski-Doo' and 'Motoski') were used to keep the greater share 
of the market possible. The consumer could also choose between 
options and accessories. But as the market saturated after 
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1972, even this very limited scope of product variation nar­
rowed: from seven different snowmobile series and twenty-two 
different models in 1970, only four series and ten different 
models were available to the customer in 1979. In this scope 
of choice, there were no systems design variations as there 
had been at the time of batch production. But as economies of 
scope tended to disappear, economies of scale became more 
important. 
CRITICAL STRATEGIC DECISIONS 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL DISCONTINUITIES 
The second aspect which is obscured by the apparent continuum 
in the increase of length of runs is the incidence of strategic 
redirection of the firm. There are at least three such critical 
points in Bombardier's history. The first was in the summer 
of 1936, when J. Armand decided to move to a plant and make 
manufacturing his main activity. The 1936/37 shift of opera­
tions involved a massive shift in the mode of operation. 
The second critical historical juncture occurs twenty-two 
years later and took much longer to resolve. After the stan­
dard design for the Ski-Doo had been developed by J. Armand 
and his son Germain, the opportunity existed for mass pro­
duction for the consumer market. But it is far from obvious 
that the inventor would have successfully steered the company 
firmly in that direction, had he survived the crisis. He dis­
liked advertizing, institutionalized marketing systems and 
techniques and discriminatory pricing; also he liked to rely 
on skilled mechanics for constant technical improvements as 
opposed to unskilled assembly line workers. Until 1956, 
Bombardier Ltd. was rapidly losing its dominant share of the 
North American snowmobile market. Between 1958 and 1961, 
in spite of the menace of losing the dominant market position, 
J. Armand Bombardier was very involved in the development of 
the forestry device, the cutter-buncher. He invested in 
eight prototypes and much inventive effort in this design. 
Obviously, his priorities were technical rather than market 
determined. T.B. Fraser of the Quebec North Shore Paper 
Company claims that 
If J. Armand Bombardier had been spared, he 
might have done for the logging industry what 
he has done for the winter sports and trans­
portation with the Ski Doo. 
J. Armand Bombardier's death marked a decisive turning point. 
The family could no longer rely on the inventiveness of the 
master mechanic and the informal communication network he had 
with other mechanics. The family concern, under the leader­
ship of his son-in-law, Laurent Beaudoin, a lawyer, decided 
to put all their investment in the Ski Doo. Between 1967 and 
1973, the family company invested heavily in specialized 
machinery and assembly line equipment in order to reduce the 
unit costs. An organizational crisis had been resolved by a 
strategic decision. 
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No sooner had one been resolved than another crisis loomed. 
In 1972 the snowmobile market plummeted. Although its re-
covery was long expected, it failed to materialize. Bombardier 
Ltd. was then stuck with considerable excess capacity. In 
1975, with the assistance of the Caisse des Dépôts du Québec, 
another strategic step was taken, this time towards diversi-
fication. In addition, with the acquisition of M.L. Worthington, 
Bombardier Ltd. decided to buy out other transport equipment 
firms, becoming a multi-product firm. The snowmobile slowly 
became a minor part in its overall sales, althoughihe consumer 
and recreational market remained crucial. In the 1980s, the 
public transit market became the decisive one for the firm. 
Bombardier Ltd, however, relied now on multi-plant economies 
and an array of technical capabilities, and the future of the 
firm would never again be dependent on one product. 
TECHNICAL SHIFT FROM PRODUCT 
TO PROCESS INNOVATIONS 
Another condition was required before economies of scale could 
be fully reaped: technical developments had to shift from 
product to process innovation. Until 1952, all of Bombardier's 
innovations were product innovations. In the late 1940s some 
specialized machinery had been bought, but whatever process 
innovation there was remained at the level of individual or 
group know-how. But this did not imply formal engineering 
designs which could have an impact on equipment fabrication by 
Bombardier suppliers. In 1952, however, an unresolved problem 
provided an incentive to develop a machine. J. Armand Bombardier 
was dissatisfied with the slow and inadequate response that an 
American tire manufacturer was making to his demands for more 
economical production of continuous rubber treads for his snow-
mobiles. He invented and built a vulcanizing machine for his 
endless reinforced treads and tracks which allowed him to pro-
duce one every half-hour; as the tire manufacturer refused to 
develop the simple machine, he did it himself. Similar con-
straints also induced him to build a simple hydraulic press 
for the aluminum seat structure. The machines were simple 
enough to order, but he preferred to build them himself in his 
spare time rather than buy them at higher costs. In this way 
he acquired the intimate knowledge of the production tech-
niques of his suppliers. As an inventor, he had a proclivity 
to do what was interesting rather than what may be considered 
to be immediately more economically efficient, so in 1961 he 
built three hydraulic presses, and a year later Canadian Vickers 
reproduced the set. 
Tackling process technology may take various forms: learning 
to use general-purpose machine tools, adapting standard general-
purpose machinery to a specific task with jigs and fixtures, 
conceiving and designing specialized equipment, inventing new 
machinery, manufacturing and commercializing. These forms of 
acquisition of process capability all constitute a continuum. 
Few firms master process technology in all of these forms. 
Bombardier mastered his production technology in most of them. 
Although he took out a patent for his 1952 vulcanizing machine 
in order to insure his independence from rubber manufacturers, 
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there was little that was novel in the process. As for the 
1961 hydraulic presses to shape aluminum seat structures of the 
Ski Doo, he adapted well-known technology. As demand for 
Ski Doos soared, production runs put stress on the presses, and 
it became necessary to have the models rebuilt by a profes­
sional machinery maker, Canadian Vickers. His own three 
presses, after working alongside Vickers1 for a few years in 
the Valcourt plant — where the latter are still in operation — 
were later retired to a museum. Not until a decade after the 
inventor's death in 1972, when market saturation put pressure 
on the firm to cut costs, did process innovations become fre­
quent. 
In 1972, new apparatus for making endless belts was patented. 
In the following year, patents were obtained for the assembly 
of the head lamp, the bobbie wheel and the muffler; in 1974, 
for the assembly of the ski bracket and for fitting the end­
less belts; in 1975, for the steering column construction; in 
1976, for the windshield mounting and suspension spring adjust­
ment. All these process innovations were aimed at reducing 
costs of mass production. Although during that same period 
there was renewed product innovation, these product innova­
tions related to mass production process innovations. 
The product innovations of the 1970s were minor systems adjust­
ments, such as chain tensioning systems, sheave drives, blades 
for suspension, ski legs, suspension wheels, tension release 
mechanisms, adjustments for the suspension, ski snow deflec­
tors, disc brakes, air intake silencers and voltage regula­
tors. All these product innovations made the snowmobiles more 
reliable but did not change the basis system. The power of 
the innovation came from the combination of all these innova­
tions and the basic coherence between all of them. The devel­
opment of support and ancillary components also induced ex­
ternal innovations in component manufacturing. 
FROM SYSTEM TO INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
One of the preconditions of mass production and development of 
related process innovations was the emergence of a simple, re­
liable design. This occurred in two phases: first in 1935 
for the auto-ncigo, with the motive sprocket wheel and double 
reinforced tread; and later in 1958/59 with the single tread. 
The opportunity for mass production was only exploited after 
the second phase. As the Ski Doo became commercially dominant, 
it set the pattern in the industry and became accepted as the 
dominant engineering design. The core of this technical 
system — the motive sprocket wheel and reinforced tread — had 
varied little since 1935. Materials changed, designs had been 
slightly altered and special applications developed, but the 
core conception remains the same. Around a standardized core 
technology, ancillary and support technology developed to 
make it more efficient. A 'technical system* evolved. 
The ancillary and support technologies developed were numerous 
and included transmissions, gears, drives, motors, brakes and 
suspensions. These ancillary technologies considerably im­
proved the efficiency of the snowmobile technology. In some 
EARLY VERSIONS: Left— 
the mo ton ^-LQZ of the Val-
court Hotel in 1927; below— 
a 1935 model. All photos 
courtesy of the Musée J. 
Armand Bombardier, Valcourt, 
Québec. 
thf^-oooi of°?959.b°tt0m-a '^''—version of 'Hus.e^ 
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cases, the improvement made all the difference between relia-
bility and frequent breakdowns, adoption or rejection. The 
search for improvements seems to have had its own autonomous 
momentum with one problem leading to another. Bombardier's 
patent records reflect this shifting technical agenda and focus 
of improvements. After the initial 1958/59 design, a pulley 
transmission was developed to increase the speed (1962 patent). 
Then bearing seals were developed (1965 patent). Snow accumu-
lated on the tread, slowing the vehicle down periodically and 
a snow expelling system was devised (1965). As the vehicle 
increased its acceleration capacity, the transmission system 
represented a limit to its performance, so an automatic trans-
mission was developed (1965). As the vehicle needed to change 
speeds more frequently than a road vehicle, a variable speed 
transmission system was developed (1968). The speedy vehicle 
then required a new braking system and a patent was taken out 
in 1970. The rapid vehicle then provided a rocky ride and a 
suspension system was patented in 1972. Each technical achieve-
ment made Bombardier focus on the next limit to the performance 
of his vehicle, lending its own logic to the technical develop-
ment. Thus evolved an interdependent system. 
The development of a system also had its business dimension. 
J. Armand Bombardier paid close attention to the control of 
manufacturing for each component, whether sprocket, tread, 
plastic parts or aluminum parts. Almost all component tech-
nologies were developed by him, except for Arctic Cat's front 
ski suspension. This technical control implied direct business 
control of subsidiaries, usually through a relative in the 
Eastern Townships. The rubber components in Roskin Falls, for 
example, were controlled by his son Germain. 
The new management was to continue this strategy of upstream 
control of components, sometimes by acquiring financial control 
of firms, as in the case of Lohnerwerke G.M.B.H. of Vienna. 
The new management would also extend this vertical integration 
downstream to marketing, accessories, public education, regula-
tion, sport promotion, resort and trail expansion. Much of 
the economic benefits of the snowmobile production accrued 
to the Québec Eastern Townships only because 80% of all com-
ponents of the product are directly controlled by the firm and 
are located in the region. 
The technological system of the snowmobile is accompanied 
today by a modest but significant complex of interrelated in-
dustrial activities, linking the main factory with component 
suppliers. The industrial techniques for which the firm has 
competence comprise bearings, springs, wheels, voltage regula-
tors and lubrication devices. The automotive techniques in-
clude steering, transmissions, suspensions, brakes, drives, 
clutches and mufflers. Various shoes are used for the vehicles: 
skis, tracks, wheels. The firm uses different materials: 
aluminum, plastics, fibreglass and rubber. Furthermore, it has 
acquired competence in corresponding production techniques. 
The firm has experience in the following markets: military, 
transport, recreational municipal, mass consumer and many in-
dustries such as foresty and petroleum. 
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In retrospect, there are many reasons other than technical to 
Bombardier's market leadership in the North American snowmo­
bile market. Although we will not examine them here, let us 
just mention the most probable ones: after the inventor's 
death, downstream integration, horizontal concentration in the 
industry, a 'shake out' in the industry, investment financing and 
government regulation of the industry. All these must have 
contributed to Bombardier still controlling 30% of the North 
American market in 1980. Without the market domination, the 
economic benefits of the technological development would have 
been more modest. 
BENEFITS 
The industrial benefits of the snowmobile are obvious today. 
In the 1970s, direct employment in the Valcourt plant alone 
ranged from 1,500 to 3,000. Many neighbouring villages around 
Valcourt also have benefited from the establishment of component 
manufacturers: Rockland Industries' rubber manufacturing in 
Kingsbury, Roski in Roskin Falls, Lasalle Plastics, Drummond 
Automatic Plating, Ville Marie Upholstering, all in the Eastern 
Townships of Québec. The manufacturing of snowmobiles in 
Valcourt generated 'upstream demand' for components and employ­
ment. Conversely, this employment has since generated income 
and demand for other goods — 'downstream effects.' Because 
the snowmobile is a consumer good, its manufacturing has 
generated 'final demand linkages,' which means snowmobiles 
being purchased from the incomes resulting directly and in­
directly from their production in and around Valcourt. 
This economic multiplier effect has been accompanied by a 
technical multiplier effect. The know-how required in one 
area has spun off into other industries. Some of the sub­
sidiaries are now technological innovators in their own right. 
Also, the material culture of Canadians and northern people 
has been transformed by an indigenous innovation. In 1978, 
parts, accessories and fuel sales resulting from the sales of 
snowmobiles — first order indirect sales — amounted to 
$400 million in Canada. Such an economic impact, however, does 
not accrue from all innovation but only from a systems innova­
tion in the consumer goods sector, given mass production and 
90% of components controlled by the firm. The process of 
translation of technological advantages into economic benefits 
is not direct, and not all innovations can expect such an 
impact. 
SOME IMPLICATIONS 
The significance of the Bombardier story for Canadian develop­
ment cannot yet be clearly evaluated. Is the early Bombardier 
story the most representative and the late mass production an 
exception? If innovation in Canada were confined to customs 
adaptation of existing systems design, the economic returns 
which we could expect would be limited to that of an early 
adopter of foreign technology. On the other hand, if Canada 
had developed complete systems technologies which are fairly 
central to its production and way of life, the economic ef­
fects of the innovation may be expected to be much greater. 
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Mass-produced innovations such as the Ski Doo have a much 
greater effect than those which are produced in batch and 
shorter runs. Our own survey^ has identified only a limited 
number of innovations produced in series or related to mass 
production since 1945: factory-produced mobile homes, Orenda 
gas turbine engines, PT6 gas turbine jet engines, the Chip 
'N Saw, mobile spars for grapple yarding, Koehring whole-tree 
short wood harvesting equipment, the papriformer, the oxygen 
steel process, C02 immobilization of animals for slaughter, 
particle boards, electromagnetic airborne surveying systems, 
sclair polyethylene pipes, semi-continuous casting of electro­
lytic copper slabs, flight simulators, inertial navigation 
systems, intermediate diazepan (Valium), 2-40 herbicides, 
teller computer for credit unions, computer booking, unitron 
hearing aids, electronic recognition of cheques, unit train 
systems, pump to cash register electronics, piggyback trailers 
for rail, auto-toll telephone systems, high-tension electric 
power transmission, remote farm radio telephones and the 
Candu reactor. It has not yet been possible to evaluate how 
marginal, or central, these mass production innovations are. 
CUSTOM BIAS 
In the* equipment sector where we conducted a phone survey, 
some forty manufacturers represented a few hundred innova­
tions covering machine shops, mechanical, electrical and elec­
tronic equipment, instruments, aircraft and avionics. We 
found that a majority of innovations was produced only in a 
custom and small batch mode. Although small firms were more 
prevalent in the custom and batch production, large firms 
were equally involved in custom and line production. As the 
equipment sector is significant for technological development, 
this custom bias has its importance. The extent to which 
equipment manufacturers standardize their products will affect 
their capability to diffuse the products and act as pressure 
groups for technological change. However, the machinery sec­
tor is relatively marginal in Canadian industry. 
If we turn to industries which are more central to Canada, a 
custom orientation is clear for plastic fabrication, industrial 
chemicals, shipbuilding and small agricultural implements. But 
mass production techniques are the rule in sawmilling, news­
print, non-ferrous metals, iron and steel, cable and wire. 
The historical record has privileged the cases of mass-produced 
innovations such as stoves, sewing machines, cooking ranges 
and the fordson (105).H But mass operations in logging may 
have been accompanied by specialty designs, somewhat unrelia­
ble, alongside the dominant German Stihl chainsaw.12 Although 
the Canadian sawmills were as massive, if not more so, than 
their US counterparts, the great variety of Canadian saw-
milling equipment does not indicate the presence of any corres­
ponding standardized equipment supplier.^-^ In construction, 
on the other hand, many materials and homes in Canada seem to 
have been mass produced early on.14 More exploration of the 
historical record would be required, however, to determine to 
what extent the large proportion of customized innovation 
limited the dynamic effects of innovation. In such an examin­
ation, the relative proportion of custom, batch or line 
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production innovations is less important than . the coupling 
of a capital goods supplier with the user industry. 
WHAT A CUSTOM BIAS IN INNOVATION WOULD EXPLAIN 
A custom bias of innovation appears to be a logical explana­
tion for many features of Canadian development. The relatively 
high level of innovation in Canada could be partly explained 
by its extreme specialization, given the low proportion of 
innovators who perform Research and Development or take out 
patents. In unit production, product development is indis­
tinguishable from production itself, and the machine shop 
setting in Canada may constitute both the research and de­
velopment and production facility.Î* It may also explain why 
very small firms in Canada are more R & D intensive per sales 
than in the United States, and the fact that design, tooling 
up, pre-production and testing do not represent such important 
expenditures as they do in the USA. " If production runs are 
short, no such expenditures would be required. This engineer­
ing, design and production tooling deficiency, however, need 
not stop — as we have seen in the early Bombardier experience — 
a firm from modifying its products in response to the needs of 
specific clients and thus reaping economies of scope. Such 
custom innovation would not induce process innovation or 
much fixed investment. In other words, this particular type 
of innovation would not be growth-inducing in Schumpeter's 
and Kuznets' sense. The paradox of an innovative country 
without internal dynamic centres of growth might be partly re­
solved if the custom bias of Canadian innovation were con­
firmed. 
SPECULATING ON POSSIBLE CAUSES 
Such an hypothesis may also have likely causes. In examining 
the possible factors of such a custom bias, one can look at a 
number of negative constraints which hinder the passage of 
innovation from custom to mass production: lack of growth 
capital in a banking system which privileges large commercial 
operations and short-term loans with high interest rates that 
disfavour medium- and long-term industrial investment. The 
quantum leap involved in making a transition to production in 
series involves financing stock, inventories and capital out­
lays. Innovators find little or no financial support even 
when they have orders in hand. Oligopsony — the control of 
demand by a few — may hinder 'supplier initiative* in the cap­
ital goods sector. The tight oligopolistic concentration of 
Canadian industry may relegate innovation to the margin of each 
oligopoly, each using expansive innovations against the other 
such as aluminum against copper, plastic against metals, corn 
against sugar. Reliance on easily-accessible foreign tech­
nology may encourage merely adaptive innovations to fit the 
specific Canadian context, use its available materials and 
energy, draw on its specific work skills and traditions and 
mesh with its regulatory and political environment. Also, 
subsidiaries within multinational operations, be they Canadian 
or foreign, may not have the prerogative to develop complete 
systems. Defence production sharing with the United States 
seems to favour the use of Canada as a flexible machine shop 
for prototype development, while large-run production will 
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usually occur in the United States.17 In our survey, we have 
encountered some equipment manufacturers and defence contrac-
tors who bragged about being the 'Rolls Royce of the industry 
(with) 15 to 20% higher prices.» Such a special type of tech-
nical leadership may not generate substantial foreign trade 
earnings, induce growth or contribute to a dynamic economy. 
An exploration of this hypothesis would also have to include 
a look into countervailing forces such as the opening of free 
trade, the Auto-Pact and the Defence Production Sharing 
Agreement, along with areas of concentrated homogenous markets 
such as banking, medicare and the wage structure. We do not 
pretend that the custom bias of innovation in Canada is an 
established fact but only that the hypothesis is worthwhile 
exploring in order to resolve the paradox of an innovative 
country wtihout the usual attributes of a technologically-
dynamic economy. 
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